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Open and closed industry clusters: The social structure of 
innovation 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper we discuss knowledge and innovation in clusters and the 
benefits of clustering from a knowledge-based perspective. Knowledge-
based resources and innovations are important sources of competitive 
advantage for firms. Aware of the importance of continuously seeking new 
knowledge firms increasingly seek knowledge-rich locations such as specific 
industry clusters across the world. These are locations characterized by the 
concentration of firms operating in related and supporting activities, a 
specialized work force and a specialized institutional environment that 
nurtures the industry. However, it is not likely that these clusters are 
always locations from which the firms will be able to draw the intended 
knowledge benefits. The social structure of the relationships between 
individuals and firms determines the extent to which knowledge will be 
created, will flow between co-located firms and bounds the knowledge 
benefits the firms may capture. We finish with a discussion of the need of 
further examination of the network dynamics involved in an industry cluster 
to obtain a clearer identification of the actual positive externalities that may 
accrue to co-locating firms. 
 
Keywords: Strategy; Industry clusters; Innovation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Modern competition has placed the emphasis of competition between 
firms on knowledge (GRANT, 1996; TEECE, 1998, 2000) and innovation 
(MCGRATH ET AL, 1996). This is largely because the traditional shelters for 
supra-competitive returns such as information or trade barriers felt 
(DUNNING, 1995; TEECE, 1998), and the access to physical, capital, and 
knowledge assets is becoming easier (BARTLETT & GHOSHAL, 1989; TEECE, 
2000) as the factors of production are becoming more internationally 
mobile.  The ability to manage the knowledge exploitation and exploration 
(MARCH, 1991) and possibly generate innovations, or some form of 
knowledge-based competitive advantage determines the firms’ position in 
the market. Firms react in many different ways, namely by seeking 
knowledge-rich locations from which they may draw knowledge not yet 
held. Hence, the study of clusters and clustering is central to the traditional 
questions that strategy scholars address: ‘why are firms different’, and 
‘what accounts for firms’ differential performance’.  
Rosenfeld (1997:10) defined industry cluster as ”a geographically 
bounded concentration of similar, related or complementary businesses, 
with active channels for business transactions, communications and 
dialogue, that share specialized infrastructure, labor markets and services, 
and that are faced with common opportunities and threats”. This definition 
emphasizes the role of the social interaction and firms cooperation in the 
nature of an industry cluster. The importance of the social interaction and 
functional relationships among clustered firms is also supported by the 
cluster definition and discussion developed by Jacobs and DeMan (1996), 
Porter (1998), Saxenian (1994), and Doeringer and Terkla’s 
(1995). Cantwell (1991) and Shaver (1998), for example, showed that 
there are significant benefits from agglomeration of firms (both domestic 
and foreign), in a tradition that dates from Marshall’s (1920) work on 
economic externalities. 
Clusters favor the likelihood of knowledge spillovers (both intended 
and unintended spillovers) among co-located firms (JAFFE ET AL., 1993). It 
is based on this belief that several scholars and public officials have 
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examined clusters for their potential for the generation of new knowledge 
and new innovations. The proximity among firms eases the coming into 
contact of firms and the sharing of resources, knowledge and capabilities. 
These knowledge spillovers that the interaction entails are also likely to 
promote the overall cluster competitive advantage and reinforce the 
attractiveness of the location inducing other leading firms and 
multinationals to search for these locations for their foreign investment 
(FDI) operations (DRIFFIELD & MUNDAY, 2000).   
Despite the existing research and debate on the role of clusters for 
knowledge accrual and innovations, it is yet to be uncovered whether all 
types of clusters actually generate knowledge benefits. It is likely that while 
in some clusters the social structure bounding individuals and firms 
promotes knowledge creation and sharing, in other clusters the social 
structure is less favorable for the exchanges and sharing of personnel, 
resources and information. The fact is that there is evidence that many 
firms that are not located in clusters are some of the most important 
innovators in their respective industries. These firms may have identified 
that clustering does not convey substantial benefits. For example, the Dutch 
Phillips and the US Xerox or Texas Instruments are not in a major cluster 
and yet they have come up with important knowledge and gestated 
important innovations. 
In this paper we seek to extend on previous research focusing 
specifically on two major dimensions: the knowledge dynamics involved in a 
cluster, and the social structure of relationships in the clusters. These two 
aspects may, at least partly, drive whether there is actually an abnormal 
amount of valuable knowledge being generated in a cluster. These two 
aspects may also help us in understanding the kind of business and social 
relationships that we need to promote in a cluster for it to truly contribute 
for a knowledge-based competitive advantage of co-located firms. 
Moreover, this paper may help us in shedding some light on the 
characteristics that industry clusters should hold to be environments of 
unusual innovative activity. 
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This paper is organized as follows. The first section discusses the 
current state of research on clusters and presents clusters as locations of 
rich innovation activity. The second section discusses de importance of 
innovation. The third section focuses on how the network (social) ties 
promote innovation in clusters and the fourth presents how different types 
of clusters may also have different impact on the generation of knowledge 
and innovations. In each section we present theoretically-driven 
propositions. We conclude with an overall discussion, implications for theory 
and public policy and avenues for additional research. 
 
CLUSTERS AND CLUSTERING 
The study of industry clusters, or geographic agglomerations, has 
received the attention of many scholars in strategic management, 
international business, sociology, urban development, public policy, 
geography and other disciplines. Most of the extant research points to a 
limited set of consensus surrounding the importance of clusters. For our 
purpose in this paper, it is safe to state that there is wide consensus that 
clustering promotes knowledge creation and sharing among clustered firms. 
This evidence can be traced back to Marshall’s (1920) original works and his 
statement that in a cluster “knowledge is in the air”. 
It is also reasonable to state that by locating in a cluster firms benefit 
from a wide set of positive externalities such as the access to a rich 
institutional environment, a qualified labor force, legitimacy (see, for 
example, the work by Meyer & Rowan, 1977, and DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, 
in institutional theory) reputation and status spillovers, and other 
externalities (WHEELER & MODY, 1992; JAFFE ET AL., 1993; CHANG & 
PARK, 2005). Porter (1998) noted that the potential benefits of clustering 
included: improving accessibility to specialized factors, easing access to 
market and technology information, promoting complementarities and 
cooperation among firms, access to infrastructure and increasing the 
competitive pressure.  
In international business, Shaver (1998) has suggested that locating 
in a cluster attenuates the traditional liability of foreignness (ZAHEER, 
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1995) that foreign multinationals may face when entering a country. The 
known risks and uncertainties of entering into an unfamiliar foreign country 
lead multinational firms to imitate other firms’ actions and entry modes 
strategies (KNICKERBOCKER, 1973; GUILLEN, 1992; HENISZ & DELIOS, 
2001). Partly this imitation may seek to overcome potential legitimacy 
hazards (DIMAGGIO & POWELL, 1983). Clusters may attract many firms 
and seem a popular and perhaps rational location decision simply because 
other firms are already there and legitimize the location as the place to be 
in (HAVEMAN, 1993; HAUNSCHILD & MINER, 1997).  
Clustering benefits emerge from the concentration of competitive and 
cooperative firms in related activities, up and downward the value chain, in 
a certain location (SAXENIAN, 1994; DOERINGER & TERKLA, 1995; 
PORTER, 1998). Krugman (1991) further highlighted that clustering benefits 
have elements of a self-perpetuating system due to the industry growth in 
that area that makes it ever more attractive for other firms to co-locate. 
These are issues related to, for example, the access to specialized factors, 
supply of intermediate products, and access to infrastructures (see also 
MARSHALL, 1920; PORTER, 1990).  
Clustering is not always about cooperation and benefits. Indeed there 
may coexist substantial competition between rival firms in a cluster 
(PORTER, 1998, 2000) and this competition pushes firms to be more 
innovative and generate new knowledge and technologies. It is possible that 
at least some clusters’ unusually high entrepreneurial activity is what makes 
them “hot spots” (POUDER & JOHN, 1996) for R&D. Competition may also 
emerge from the relatively free movement of the labor force among firms 
and the consequential difficulty in maintaining firm-specific resources and 
knowledge-base private. As people move among firms they transfer 
knowledge. It is thus probable that firms in a cluster become gradually 
isomorphic and holds similar (even if not identical) pools of knowledge 
(TALLMAN, JENKINS, HENRY & PINCH, 2004) that make any attempt at 
differentiation difficult. Moreover, clusters are not only about the positive 
externalities, there are potential negative effects such as the increased 
costs of labor and other factors as co-located firms compete for the same 
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inputs and markets (BAUM & MEZIAS, 1992; CHANG & PARK, 2005). For 
instance, Baum and Mezias (1992) noted that the co-location in Manhattan 
of hotels that were similar in terms of price and size and that competed with 
each other also reduced their chances of survival. 
The negative externalities of clusters are also manifest in that while 
firms may benefit from the spill-over of other firms’ knowledge, their own 
knowledge may spill-over to other firms. Hence, while Appold (1995) found 
that clustering was negatively related to performance in the US 
metalworking industry, Shaver and Flyer (2000) and Pouder and John 
(1996) noted that resource- or knowledge-rich firms would avoid clustering 
because for these firms the potential costs of the knowledge spillovers 
overcome the potential advantages of clustering. 
Hence, in the context of our study it is worth noting that clustering 
may hinder the innovation dynamism that is sought after in the first place. 
As firms in a cluster use each other as referents (SHAH, 1998) and engage 
in groupthink (PORTER, 1998) they tend to search inside the cluster for 
models to follow, rejecting outside ideas and clues. One of the most 
remarkable examples of this rigidity is the inability of the US auto industry 
to adapt to a market demanding more fuel efficient cars. 
In the European tradition the study of clusters has been largely 
supported by case studies of success (e.g., ENRIGHT, 1991; SAXENIAN, 
1994; APPOLD, 1995; CANTWELL & IAMMARINO, 1998; HENRY & PINCH, 
2002). Many of these studies show that the propensity to cluster produces 
industry concentration in certain locations, regions or cities. Generally, 
these clusters correspond broadly to old industries such as the knitwear 
industry in Carpi, pottery in Faenza, and sports cars in Modena, in Italy. In 
Switzerland, the luxury watches industry is concentrated in Geneva and the 
banking industry in Zurich. In Germany, the packaging machinery is in 
Dortmund and the shipbuilding industry in Hamburg and in Bremen. In the 
US we observe the concentration of the tire industry in Akron, Ohio, the 
automobile in the Detroit area, the well known motion pictures in 
Hollywood, and the minicomputer and electronic industry in Route 128, 
Boston and in Silicon Valley (see, for example, PORTER, 1990; ENRIGHT, 
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1991; SAXENIAN, 1994). Some studies refer to newer industries such as 
the auto industry in the UK or the moulds for plastics in Portugal. 
Regardless of whether these industries are high or low technology-
based the predominant feature is the entrepreneurial dynamism revealed in 
these regions and intertwining of firms through a network of social and 
professional ties that bound firms and individuals in the region (SAXENIAN, 
1994). These studies are often descriptive and present the idiosyncrasies of 
these locations, some historical, other regulatory, that presided to the 
emergence of these clusters. Constant to these studies is the complex web 
of social relationships that seem to embody the advantages of these 
locations. Seldom, has research examined how the underlying social 
networks fail to provide guidance in periods of, for example, technological 
change and why some clusters fail. Indeed, there are many cases of 
ultimate failure when firms and clusters are unable to readjust to the 
changing environment (see MASKELL & MALMBERG, 2001). However, the 
inability to adapt also presents us a clue as to the importance of the social 
networks and the isomorphic behaviors among co-located firms and is thus 
worthwhile studying. 
The existence of clustering advantages is likely to be important in the 
context of innovation (DRIFFIELD & MUNDAY, 2000). Received wisdom 
accepts that clusters promote innovation through technology and knowledge 
transfer, development of a skilled labor force in related industries, and the 
social infrastructure. Following this view and the majority of extant research 
we state the general proposition: 
Proposition 1 Innovation activity is higher among clustered firms than 
non clustered firms. 
 
INNOVATION 
According to Schumpeter (1950) innovation results when different 
combinations of assets’ redeployment have superior benefits and come to 
replace prior dominant combinations. In other words, innovation is the 
mechanism through which firms gain access to resources with (superior) 
positive future value, and to valuable new resource combinations that are 
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specific to the firm and that it alone may exploit (MCGRATH ET AL., 1996). 
To the extent that these new combinations incorporate difficult to imitate 
routines (NELSON & WINTER, 1982) it will take more time for competitors 
to match the innovation (that is, to imitate). However, because the 
knowledge needed for innovations is increasingly distributed across firms, 
the innovation processes are becoming increasingly “interactive” and 
require simultaneous networking among independent firms (BRESCHI, 
2000). 
In the contemporary business landscape, firms’ competitive position 
and advantage is supported on inimitable and idiosyncratic assets (AMIT & 
SCHOEMAKER, 1993; COOKE, 2001; MASKELL & MALMBERG, 2001), 
particularly their knowledge-based resources or capabilities (GRANT, 1996; 
TALLMAN ET AL., 2004). Innovations are important for the creation and 
maintenance of a sustainable competitive advantage, and impact on firms’ 
performance (MCGRATH & MACMILLAN, 2000). Innovation is important for 
firms because they may generate future sources of revenues and the basis 
for a competitive advantage over the rivals. Any innovation is founded on 
novel knowledge or a novel recombination of existing bits of knowledge. 
Through knowledge exploring strategies firms renew their assets base 
(March, 1991). Hence, it is not surprising that the role of knowledge and 
how firms access and transfer knowledge has come to the forefront of 
strategic management research as means to understand how firms create 
value and innovations (NONAKA, 1988; KOGUT & ZANDER, 1992; NONAKA 
& TAKEUCHI, 1995; CONNER & PRAHALAD, 1996; GRANT, 1996). 
A clearer approach to the problem of innovation requires the analysis 
of the extent to which the innovation is path-breaking, radical, or 
competence destroying or alternatively, incremental or competence-
enhancing. Tushman and Anderson (1986) noted that when faced with 
radical competence destroying technological shifts established firms are at a 
disadvantage vis-à-vis new entrants. This is largely due to firms being stuck 
in their established ‘core rigidities’ and recurrently performed tasks (CYERT 
& MARCH, 1963; LEONARD-BARTON, 1992) or routines (NELSON & 
WINTER, 1982).  It is likely, however, that if these firms are connected to 
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other firms (with formal and/or informal ties) the reconfiguration of the 
firms’ resources and capabilities may be eased. That is, firms that have 
more extensive ties are less likely to suffer from technological shifts insofar 
as these shifts do not destroy the value of the firms’ networks of 
relationships. Moreover, the firms’ social ties may bring in actionable 
information and business contacts that permit continuous learning and 
reconfiguring of the capabilities. Although it seems reasonable to suggest 
that when the technological shifts are less path-breaking and build on the 
firms’ capabilities the incumbents have an advantage over new entries, 
since any adjustment to an incremental innovation is far less complex. 
Notwithstanding, in any case, the social networks may be useful for a faster 
adaptation and upgrade.  
A complementary approach to the problem of knowledge and 
innovation may be taken looking at the nature of knowledge. It seems 
reasonable to suggest that the degree to which the knowledge involved is 
explicit or tacit determines the ease and extent of imitation by competitors 
(TEECE, 1997). Explicit knowledge is easily transferable and codifiable 
(SZULANSKI, 1996) and therefore more subject to unintended diffusion. 
Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, is less easily codified and is more 
difficult to transfer (Winter, 1987; KOGUT & ZANDER, 1992; ZANDER & 
KOGUT, 1995) and diffuse (intended or unintended) because it is frequently 
embedded in the individuals, routines, idiosyncratic resources and 
organizational skills (NELSON & WINTER, 1982; GRANT, 1986). Szulanski 
(1996) noted that causal ambiguity and different absorptive capacity 
between firms increases knowledge stickiness hindering inter-firms transfer. 
Hence, to access tacit knowledge firms may hire away employees of a rival 
firm or, in alternative, they may co-locate because the geographic proximity 
eases the inter-firms flows of knowledge. 
In sum, an overall review of the clustering literature that uses a 
knowledge-based lens leads us to formulate a general proposition: 
Proposition 2 Firms cluster in certain regions to benefit from the 
innovative potential. 
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Verspagen (1999) noted that the most important element in 
innovations developed in regional innovation systems (i.e., clusters) is the 
social networks. Through networking with other firms with both different 
and complementary specializations the innovative potential increases and 
more innovations are likely to be generated. In general, clustering 
economies can also spur competition, which encourages information, 
knowledge, and technology transfer among related networked firms. The 
transfer of knowledge and technology among these inter-connected firms 
can lead to new industry growth, innovations, and drive the overall growth 
of the cluster (PORTER, 1998).  That is, industry clusters seem to be areas 
of munificent innovation. 
Rosenkopf and Tushman (1998) argued that “firms do not make 
decisions about which technological options to pursue without regard to the 
actions of other firms – technological evolution is generated by communities 
of organizations”. That is, individuals imitate other individuals’ choices. 
Institutional theory designates this as isomorphism (MEYER & ROWAN, 
1977). To imitate others, firms must be aware of what each is doing, and be 
somehow connected through business and social interaction. These 
relationships exist in clusters (SAXENIAN, 1990, 1994).  
 
CLUSTERS: INNOVATION IN A SOCIAL MILIEUX 
Industry clusters are largely characterized by their social networks 
that tie and bind firms and individuals together in a delimited geographic 
space. Clusters are often referred to as networks, even if bounded to a 
region. Much of the knowledge generated in a cluster is engendered through 
the exchange of knowledge among firms. However, to the best of our 
knowledge it is still unclear what, if any, is the relationship between the 
structure of the network and the distribution and variety of knowledge of 
the firms. Notwithstanding, at the individual level there is research and 
evidence that the composition and content of the networks of the managers 
matter (PODOLNY, 2001). 
Although the knowledge-based of the firm view posits that knowledge 
exchange between firms is essential for the generation of knowledge and 
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innovations (KOGUT & ZANDER, 1992; GALUNIC & RODAN, 1998) it is 
unclear whether and how the type of network ties binding firms and the 
structure and content of the network matters (UZZI, 1996). The type, 
content and configuration of the network ease or hinder the knowledge 
diversity held by the network members and how this knowledge is 
transferred among firms for future recombination. In the previous sections, 
we discussed the importance and impact of clusters and innovation for 
contemporary competitiveness. In this section we focus more specifically on 
the social networks. In the next section we suggest that the social structure 
or the specific characteristics of the cluster determines the configuration of 
the ties among firms, the flows of employees and who in fact drives the 
innovation process and outcomes altogether. 
In understanding how the networks matter, we may take a 
structuralist perspective. The structuralist view focus on the benefits that 
individuals and firms may draw from specific structural characteristics of 
their networks. The studies of Burt (1992) and Coleman (1990) express this 
view on the variation in the connectedness of a person’s contacts – this is 
the structural holes perspective. Burt’s (1992) structural whole theory 
focuses on the brokering opportunities of a network full of disconnected 
contacts and the advantages of the diversity of information or knowledge 
that this position concedes. The disconnected contacts access non-
redundant information that may be used or brokered between firms. Hence, 
the core idea is that a firm may have an advantage if it is in a brokerage 
position in a sparse network of disconnected contacts. That is, if the firm is 
in a position connecting two firms that are not otherwise connected (hence 
in a structural hole, according to BURT, 1992, 2000) it holds an advantage 
that may accrue on the form of added prestige, access to resources – 
namely knowledge-based resources and information, higher status and 
power, than if they were in a closed network. In a clusters setting we may 
search to identify those firms that are connected to firms in and outside the 
network, or cluster. These firms are likely to occupy structural holes and are 
thus more likely to be in the forefront of the innovations. In sum, a network 
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of disconnected contacts is often associated with access to different 
information that increases the pool of opportunities.  
The social networks research has used the network structure to 
discuss information and knowledge heterogeneity. Higher heterogeneity 
eases and speeds the discovery of new opportunities (GRANOVETTER, 
1974). That is, in essence, the access to more diverse knowledge allows the 
broker to be more fully informed. However, in an open network all firms will 
have easier access to novel knowledge, than in closed networks. Moreover, 
non-redundant ties bring about a larger knowledge diversity which will be 
instrumental in stimulating innovativeness. Notwithstanding, the causality 
herein implicit lacks empirical confirmation and warrants further theoretical 
development. 
A major force into play connecting network and knowledge research 
is the novelty of the information and knowledge accessed. As Burt (1992) 
noted, strong ties usually convey similar and known – hence, redundant - 
information. Strong ties are not conveyors of novelty. Conversely, weak ties 
are assumed to be a source of non-redundant knowledge. Firms with open 
networks more often engage in disconnected (or weaker tie) contacts and 
are more likely to acquire a wider array of information. The access to 
heterogeneous knowledge should advance the innovative potential. 
Inferring to the industry clusters, it seems reasonable to suggest that 
clusters that are more open to a variety of external contacts will be exposed 
to more new information, knowledge and opportunities than closed industry 
clusters. Hence, we suggest that: 
Proposition 3 Open clusters are more likely to have higher levels of 
innovation activity than closed clusters.  
The degree to which a cluster is open or closed to outside contacts 
may be originated in several factors such as the role of a dominant firm, 
local policies, or even the cultural embeddedness of individual 
entrepreneurs and managers. In a complementary approach, the type of 
social structure of the cluster may influence the munificence of 
entrepreneurial activity. Entrepreneurial opportunities may be realized in 
some form of innovation, and the identification of the opportunity itself may 
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be pointed out by an outside firm. Important, thus, is the ability to pursue 
those opportunities that were identified. Firms in open clusters are free to 
pursue opportunities outside their immediate market and technological 
landscape, thus promoting the pursuit and implementation of 
entrepreneurial opportunities. In this type of social structure deviant 
behaviours are not socially condemned or hindered by the other actors in 
the cluster. Moreover, novel ideas, opportunities and markets brought by 
outsiders are fertile ground for the gestation of new entrepreneurial firms. 
Hence, we suggest that: 
Proposition 4 Open clusters are more likely to have higher levels of 
entrepreneurship than closed clusters. 
It is worth noting in this respect that at a lower level – at the level of 
the firm, rather than among firms – there is evidence (see HANSEN, 1999) 
that weak ties among sub-units have a positive effect on innovation once 
each contributes with different pieces of knowledge for a certain innovation. 
The apparent paradox is that it is through strong ties that this knowledge is 
better transferred, particularly systemic, complex, tacit knowledge, as we 
discussed previously. In a cluster, the proximity among firms eases the 
transfer of knowledge given the strong ties connecting firms and the 
mobility of workers. Moreover, knowledge is more easily transferred among 
similar firms since there is a reduction in causal ambiguity and a higher 
absorptive capacity among these firms. However, it is the knowledge that is 
brought in from outside that is most likely unknown to the clustered firms, 
and the ties to outside firms are at best weak ties.  
 
TYPES OF CLUSTERS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE 
Breschi (2000) noted that increasingly innovation is a joint effort and 
does not proceed by isolated firms. This means that alliances and different 
forms of partnerships are important but also that proximity to rivals, clients 
and suppliers may ease pooling together complementary knowledge and 
resources (TEECE, 1986, 1997). In the latest and more sophisticated 
designs, clusters, alliances (BARNEY, 2001) and the various forms of 
partnerships increasingly appear not only as mutual competitive alternatives 
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but as strategic complements (see DOZ e HAMEL, 1998, for a good 
reference in alliances application).  
As Breschi (2000:214) highlighted the “ability to innovate is affected 
by the spatial proximity to external sources of knowledge, one should then 
observe wide differences in the innovative capabilities among firms located 
in different geographical areas”. In addition, it is possible that these 
geographical areas idiosyncratic features favor or impede the sharing and 
transfer of knowledge among firms. In other words, it seems likely that 
some characteristics may make some clusters more innovation abundant 
than others. In fact, it is our tenant in this paper that some clusters will 
promote innovations while others may not do so, and the social structure is 
one of the determining factors in explaining why innovation activity may 
vary sharply across industry clusters. 
Different types of clusters have different underlying social structures. 
The task of identifying an exhaustive typology of clusters is beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, we may use Markusen’s (1996) four types of 
industrial districts - or clusters - to illustrate briefly how different social 
structures and organizational configurations are likely to influence the 
generation of knowledge and of innovations. Markusen’s (1996) descriptive 
typology of clusters is based on various criteria such as (a) the firms’ 
configuration, (b) internal or external orientation, or the embeddedness of 
firms within their cluster and with agents outside the cluster, (c) 
governance structures, (d) the role of the state, (e) the role of large firms, 
and (f) extent of cooperation and types of business relationships. 
Following, we present a brief description of each of the four types 
based on Markusen’s (1996) characterization. It is worth noting at the 
outset to state that in the context of our study, the relevant issue is to try 
to understand in which type of cluster the innovation potential is greater. 
Or, more broadly, the configuration of the firms and relationships that 
underlies to knowledge creation in clusters beyond the arguments on the 
appropriation of rents from innovation (FERREIRA, TALLMAN & LI, 2005). 
Perhaps, related to this broad question it is worth discussing who is likely to 
generate the innovations within each type of cluster. In sum, the types of 
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firms, the models of outsourcing pursued and the strength of the business 
ties should matter, and these vary in open and closed industry clusters. 
Some important elements for each type of cluster are appointed here. 
The Marshallian industrial districts are composed of multiple small, 
innovative and locally-owned firms that are deeply embedded in local and 
regional ties to other co-located firms in a broadly cooperative governance 
system, which favor their survival and adaptation. This type of clusters is 
frequent in Europe in the old industrial districts. The intra-cluster exchanges 
are dense and the employees move frequently across firms but within the 
cluster. There is a high degree of cooperation among competitor co-located 
firms who share risks, costs, and knowledge, while an idiosyncratic local 
culture is a major trait of this type of cluster.  
These clusters are characterized by an overwhelming inward focus 
and a population of small to medium enterprises. The employees are mobile 
but essentially to other incumbent firms inside the cluster and it seems 
plausible to advance that we will observe strong mimetism among firms. 
Although there may exist strong entrepreneurial drive, it is most likely to be 
from employees existing their previous employer to create their own firm 
and explore umbilical ties to the previous employer (Ferreira, Tavares & 
Hesterly, 2006). While employee mobility eases the transfer of tacit 
knowledge, it becomes gradually less likely that these employees will be 
actually transferring knowledge not yet held. 
The frequent shifts of employees from one firm to another inside the 
cluster make knowledge assume a ‘local public good’ character and is 
depicted by Markusen as “the secrets of the industry are in the air” 
(1996:299) (see also, ARROW, 1962; OLSON, 1965; SCHELLING, 1978). 
These clusters are relatively closed, are probably more resistant to change 
and less likely to search outside its boundaries. Moreover, since the purpose 
of innovation and R&D is to generate commercially viable knowledge and 
the small firms are less able to keep the knowledge from spilling over to the 
public domain they have a lower incentive to innovate. This feature allows 
to the formulation of the following proposition: 
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Proposition 5.1 Clusters composed of small firms are likely to 
generate a low level of innovation activity. 
The Hub-and-spoke districts revolve around one or more dominant 
and externally oriented firms, typically vertically integrated, and surrounded 
by multiple smaller suppliers (both local and external). Two documented 
examples of this type of cluster include Seattle (Boeing) and Toyota City 
(Toyota). Although the specific morphology of this type of cluster may vary 
(see MARKUSEN, 1996, for a discussion) the dominant firm(s) have 
extensive ties to suppliers, competitors and clients outside the cluster, the 
employees’ mobility is substantially lower than in the Marshallian type, and 
the hub firm imposes the terms of the exchanges with the local spoke firms.  
A major facet of these clusters is the presence of a central hub 
firm(s) holding a dominating position and a large market power tying 
suppliers in long-term contracts. Probably these are clusters with low 
degree of cooperation among dominant firms in sharing the risks and the 
costs of knowledge creation. The dominant firm imposes the pace and 
objectives of innovation and it is reasonable to suggest that innovation 
objectives are outsourced modularly to small and specialized firms. 
Alternatively, the central, dominant, firm is more likely to develop in-house 
the knowledge innovation and then transfer it contractually through 
outsourcing ties. These clusters may be more open when the dominant firm 
is, for example, a large multinational firm or a large firm with clients 
worldwide, and in specific industries such as the airlines or automobile. 
In these clusters, the large firms will likely generate the innovations 
and account for most outflows of knowledge spillovers to the clustered 
firms. They are thus aware that other firms will free-ride on their innovation 
efforts. The hazards of knowledge spillovers and difficulty in appropriating 
the rents from R&D may be the reason why some of the best firms prefer 
not to cluster (POUDER & JOHN, 1996). Notwithstanding, it is reasonable to 
suggest that these firms will commit to some level of innovation activities 
with co-located firms to maintain the ability to assimilate and exploit new 
knowledge captured from external agents; that is to maintain some 
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absorptive capacity (COHEN & LEVINTHAL, 1990). This leads to formulate 
as follows: 
Proposition 5.2 Clusters dominated by a large outward looking firm 
are likely to generate a high level of innovation activity, mostly 
provided by the dominant firm. 
The State-anchored industrial districts are centered around one or 
more public institutions (e.g., university, military, and so forth) that anchor 
local economic activity. The nature and scope of the local economic activity 
is determined by and dependent on these anchors. A variety of suppliers 
may emerge around these large institutions, with whom they establish 
short-term contracts. Given that these are state-funded institutions, 
decisions may be largely based outside the location or be dependent on 
political shifts. In addition, ties of these large institutions to clients and 
suppliers are not necessarily of a local nature. 
Indeed, a similar situation may occur for the state-anchored 
industrial districts given that these are characterized by the presence of a 
large anchor firm such as anchor firm or legally contracted out, but in either 
case the anchor firm will probably retain the rights to the innovation and be 
able to protect it from unintended diffusion. This situation occurs for the 
military-driven research, for instance. Hence, we suggest that: 
Proposition 5.3 Clusters dominated by an inward looking firm are 
likely to generate a low level of innovation activity, and the innovations 
are addressed to the dominant firm’s activity. 
Lastly, the Satellite industrial platforms consist of an assemblage of 
unconnected plants, mostly subsidiaries of multinational firms, embedded in 
external organizational links (MARKUSEN, 1996:293). These may be 
composed of high-technology firms or of firms that seek to exploit low cost 
of local resources but are generally large, foreign owned firms. Although the 
specific activities may vary substantially within this type, these firms must 
have the ability to stand alone and fairly detached from up- and down-ward 
agents. The case of the agglomeration of unrelated research facilities of 
large multinational firms in the Research Triangle (in North Carolina, USA) 
is noted as a notable example of this type of cluster (MARKUSEN, 1996). In 
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addition, intra-cluster exchange is minimal and business ties to co-located 
agents are minimal in favor of stronger ties to the parent headquarters and 
other non-local units. 
In these clusters firms are fairly detached from local agents and any 
innovation is likely to be developed in relative isolation in-house. The scarce 
exchange flows with other co-located firms does not promote frequent 
locally bound innovations. Given that these firms are largely ‘stand-alone’ 
operations the diffusion of knowledge to potential imitators is more difficult 
and hence innovations through collaboration or the recombination of 
dispersed knowledge is not likely to be very frequent. The mobility of 
personnel among firms is limited and inter-firms exchanges are scarce. This 
type of clusters is also reasonably closed in terms of generating a social 
structure promoting knowledge creation.  
But the complex characteristics of business units, in opposition to the 
sole formation of the three previous clusters, may take advantage of more 
sophisticated designs. Due to their condition of value generators for their 
corporations, they have also taken advantage of geographical proximity to 
develop their strategic alliances in the various levels of the productive 
channel (see VARADARAJAN & RAMANUJAM, 1987, as a good reference for 
value generation in diversification and VYAS ET AL., 1995, for how to do it 
by means of alliances). Therein, the principle is to promote frequent 
innovations by means of the preservation of their respective central 
competences and of the collaboration in their outlying competences (HAMEL 
ET AL., 1989). Since the objective is precisely knowledge exchange, and the 
firms are bounded to a geographical cluster without necessarily 
characterizing their collaboration as so, major exchange appears among 
firms, increasing the imitation potential (BARNEY, 2001), the potential for 
the use of dispersed knowledge, and the generation of some mobility of the 
personnel as well. This broader understanding is a new window for the 
following proposition: 
In sum, the analysis of the social structure across clusters and their 
impact on the innovation potential is a significant advancement over 
existing research. Although there are no general rules as to who the 
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innovator firms are or as to what makes the most innovative regions – since 
they are likely to vary along multiple factors, such as the cluster 
configuration, the types of ties binding firms, the extent of employee 
mobility, and so forth – it is reasonable to suggest that we need to look 
deeper at the very heart of the clusters and their social structure. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
A major tenant of this paper is that we need further examination of 
the network dynamics involved in an industry cluster to obtain a clearer 
identification of the actual positive externalities that may accrue to co-
locating firms. It is possible that some of these benefits are firms specific 
while others are location specific. It is further reasonable to state that not 
all firms in the cluster are alike, rather they are heterogeneous, even 
though there may exist a strong pressure towards assuming isomorphic 
behaviors through mimetism. The composition of the cluster drives the 
benefits firms may draw, namely the knowledge benefits.  
Although we tend to focus on the positive effects of clustering it is 
easy to infer negative effects. These are effects related to, for example, 
increased competition for the same resources, firms engaging in too much 
mimetism and groupthink thus failing to adapt to changing environments, 
and the unintended spillover of firms own knowledge or technologies. In 
fact, Porter and Stern (2001) had already stated that innovation in clusters 
is promoted when the cluster hold firms with different backgrounds. This 
paper intends to contribute to the debate on the type of social structure 
that is more beneficial for innovation and knowledge generation in a cluster. 
Many of the clustering advantages focused upon in prior research 
highlight the essential role of the social networks in these regions (PORTER, 
1998) and the mobility of employees from one firm to another. That is, the 
flows of experience-based (or tacit and experiential) knowledge among 
firms are fuelled by the exchange of employees. This process permits the 
inter-firms transfer of knowledge that otherwise if relatively immobile 
(KOGUT & ZANDER, 1992; SZULANSKI, 1996). It is further advanced that 
cooperation is a basic force tying firms in the cluster. Moreover there are 
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other non-economic externalities that seemingly makes cluster a rational 
location decision, or even a knowledge-based strategy. These externalities 
are related to gains in legitimacy and reduction of uncertainty through 
imitation (DIMAGGIO & POWELL, 1983; HENISZ & DELIOS, 2001; GUILLEN, 
2002). 
 Our discussion of the knowledge- and innovation-related benefits of 
clustering highlights the importance of maintaining an appropriate 
proportion of ties to firms outside the cluster. These ties bear novel 
knowledge. Ideally, a firm will be able to occupy a structural hole brokering 
with the other firms in the cluster. Hence, the network content matters, 
which means that we need to look at the type of cluster and the possibility 
to carry relationships to firms outsiders to the cluster. The network 
structure foundational to the cluster thus matters. Sparse networks permit 
the firm to access and possibly absorb heterogeneous knowledge. The 
structure of the network thus helps firms in either exposing the firm to 
varied knowledge, to opportunities and to the possibility of simply brokering 
the information.  
Future research may evolve through multiple contiguous avenues.  
First, it is worth pursuing the empirical evaluation of the innovativeness of 
clusters compared to non-clustered firms. It is possible that innovation in 
clusters faces the serious issue of knowing who captures de rents from 
innovations (FERREIRA & LI, 2005). Second, researchers may look at how 
different governance models really impact on co-located firms’ ability to 
innovate. That is, is innovation a phenomenon that occurs regardless of the 
structure and composition of the cluster or do we find inter-cluster 
variations that are worth examining for both public policy and business 
strategy? This line of research may find in inter-industry studies a more 
prolific setting.  Third, an evolutionary perspective on the relationships 
proposed is likely to be an interesting endeavor with theory building 
potential. That is, does the innovation activity evolve over the clusters’ life 
cycle and the technologies and markets mature? Finally, it is worth 
assessing how industry’s idiosyncrasies determine who is more innovative in 
a cluster - is it a small firm, a large firm, or a dominant firm? 
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Several implications result from our understanding of how 
knowledge and innovations are generated in clusters and the underlying 
social structure that is most favorable for this purpose. Every innovation 
requires at least the recombination of known bits of knowledge and every 
innovation warrants protection so that the future rents accruing from the 
innovation are captured by the innovator firm. Ultimately it is up to the 
manager to figure out where to locate to access knowledge and where to 
locate to impede the firm’s own knowledge from dissipation to competitors 
(TEECE, 2000). 
In other words, managers need to decide in which kind of cluster to 
locate to benefit the most of knowledge spillovers. That is because clusters 
seem spots of particularly intense innovative activity, or hot spots (POUDER 
& JOHN, 1996) but also rely on extensive inter-firm exchanges and 
collaboration. Rosenkopf and Nerkar (2001), for example, noted that 
innovations (specifically radical discontinuities) are likely to be at least 
partially based in knowledge and/or technology that reside outside the 
firm’s boundaries. Nagarajan and Mitchell (1998) advanced that firms must 
rely on coordination among firms through strong interrelationships to 
generate innovations.  
For public officials it is important to note that appropriate policies 
aimed at developing competitive clusters requires not only the expenditure 
in creating a high quality infrastructure and adequate institutional 
environment (schools, technology centers, R&D labs, and so forth) but also 
needs to take into account the human and cultural dimension that is 
foundational to the social structure of the region. 
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